The year was 1945. World War II was coming to a close and peace talks were increasingly common. But suddenly, in the time it took to press one button, to say one final prayer, the international society as we knew it was over. Japan fell to the paroxysm of blinding light as the sky imploded over thousands of gaping jaws; screams were smothered by the deafening roar of the cataclysm that was the atomic bomb. International relations were changed forever.

 When facing the reality of nuclear technologies, the main objective in the twenty-first century nuclear weapons debate is nonproliferation, or total disarmament, yet it is not a realistic goal. In the global community, the “count to zero” is met with enthusiasm; still, advocates fail to recognize that while such goals are ideal, they are simply unfeasible. Joint disarmament necessitates the collaboration of all nations equally, disregarding fear of attack. However, countries are far from unreserved trust; China, for instance, is avidly developing its nuclear armament supply, its numbers having risen 25% since 2005. [1] But without international cooperation, the objective of nonproliferation contradicts that of deterrence. Deterrence is the primary international nuclear policy, consisting of the discouragement of nuclear attack through the threat of immense retaliation. Thus, mistrust coupled with the use of nukes to remain a threat prevents the achievement of nonproliferation in the near future; in the meantime, issues such as safety measures and intermediate steps are still plausible. As an advocate for nonproliferation, President Barack Obama recently stated:

America seeks a world with no nuclear weapons. As long as nuclear weapons exist, we must retain a strong deterrent. But instead of threatening to kick them out of the G8, we need to work with Russia to take U.S. and Russian ballistic missiles off hair-trigger alert; to dramatically reduce the stockpiles of our nuclear weapons and material; to seek a global ban on the production of fissile material for weapons; and to expand the U.S.-Russian ban on intermediate-range missiles so that the agreement is global. [2]

Obama recognized the crucial flaws of past nuclear policy – reliance on deterrence alone as strategy and on total disarmament alone as policy – and advocated for simpler means of change. The superpowers' reliance on deterrence, although successfully employed thus far, with steadfast adherence to the necessity of nuclear abolition, harms foreign policy by inhibiting movement towards practical marginalization steps and precautions for the chance of nuclear attack.

            When determining future nuclear policies, military leaders must acknowledge significant variances in nuclear war from conventional and even Cold War strategy, to which deterrence has heretofore been applied. The creation of nuclear weapons made facets of conventional war strategy, such as reliance on armament numbers and tolerance of risk, obsolete. In power states and rogue nations alike, nuclear circumstances are constantly changing, most notably through an ongoing increase of weapons, both completed and in creation. The number of states in possession of nuclear arms has increased from the Cold War’s two to nine, diminishing the likelihood of effective deterrence or of mutual assured destruction, a strategy guaranteeing complete destruction in war upon attack. [3] Yet utter disregard of old doctrines of thought would be counterproductive; rather than starting anew to redevelop warfare axioms, strategy should consider flaws and benefits from past policies while keeping ideas inherent of war, both moral and practical. From a moral viewpoint, just war theory, or jus ad bellum, validates all forms of war; its principles, thousands of years old, naturally apply between two principled enemies with similar mores. The doctrine of military ethics calls for a war to have just cause, decent intentions, declaration by authority, likelihood of success, a mitigating end, and use as a last resort. [4] From a practical stance, any military policy will still need to have the basic framework of solid logistics led by a clear intent. While the core of nuclear policy remains the same, substantial new conditions necessitate acknowledgement.

Despite some consistencies with past military strategy, nations’ outlook on nuclear war must adapt to today’s conditions to properly assess appropriate action. Bernard Brodie, an American military strategist, noted: “Thus far the chief purpose of our military establishment has been to win wars. From now on its chief purpose must be to avert them. It can have almost no other useful purpose.” [5]  While war doctrine traditionally involves killing as many of the enemy as possible, stemming from territorial conquests, nations cannot employ the same tactics in nuclear war. Initiation of nuclear attack ensures reactive and equal retaliation, forming the theory behind mutual assured destruction. Thus, if a nation enters a war today with the objective to take as many lives as possible, the nation assumes the probability of the same damage to its own people. In the past, nuclear weapons have been regarded in a virtually casual manner. President Eisenhower once stated: “Atomic weapons have achieved virtually conventional status within our armed forces. [. . .] I see no reason why they shouldn’t be used just exactly as you would use a bullet.” [6] However, such a strategy can no longer exist today in collaboration with mutual assured destruction. Alternatively, nuclear arms turn policies towards a strategic war of attrition, whose primary goal is to deplete the enemy of their weapons rather than simply kill, the possession of weapons intended only to deter attack. Such defensive strategies, while necessary, do nothing to address the root of the issue and instead detract from measures that could be taken to end conflict overall.

            Although perpetually a popular nuclear doctrine, reliance on deterrence fails to account for the increasing likelihood that such strategy will fail. Deterrence, albeit a highly rational military strategy, has a strong possibility of failure for two main reasons. First, it incorrectly assumes that all nuclear situations are controllable and all leaders rational. Deterrence does not account for the possibility of irrational leaders with deviant values, a problem exacerbated by the pressured, impulsive nature of crises involving nuclear warfare. Furthermore, launching capabilities extend beyond a nation’s leader; insubordination or misunderstood orders pose a threat to the influence of deterrence, while the possibility of a purely accidental launch is imminent. The Journal of Peace Research found that in a "lengthy crisis," a false nuclear alarm extreme enough to provoke retaliation would occur 50% of the time. [7] False alarms have happened in the past and have come jarringly close to causing a nuclear attack, especially with unreliable early warning systems. For instance, in 1978, William Perry was woken up by a phone call from his general, who told Perry that computers showed a projected 200 missiles being sent from the Soviet Union to the United States. [8] With only a few seconds of consideration, Perry had to decide whether or not to retaliate. He correctly chose to wait it out; the alert was revealed to be a false alarm. However, this example serves to show legitimate danger of unintentional launch, the likes of which are entirely unaffected by deterrence.

The second issue with deterrence is that it does not account for the threat of rogue groups. Maverick or non-nations, especially those that view the global security system as deficient, threaten anonymous nuclear attacks, anxious to avoid global scrutiny. To generate anonymity and remove suspicion, such a state would need to create multiple possible suspect nations, and would aid other rogue states in attaining nuclear weapons. Also, terrorism poses a direct danger as terrorists seek nuclear arms; Al Qaida has been seeking such weapons for over 10 years. [9] But terrorists are suicidal and thus completely undeterrable, with a lack of a “return address” at which nations could direct a retaliation threat. [10] The only thing in terrorists’ way is the weapon itself; plans for weapons have already been leaked. [11][12] Yet weapons are terrifyingly easy to attain: while only developed nations are capable of creating high-power reactors, others can purchase them under minimal safeguards. [13] The safety of nuclear materials is not highly monitored, especially in Russia after the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Stanford research suggests that about 130 kilograms of Russian uranium and plutonium was stolen between 1991 and 2002, with only 8 kilograms of plutonium necessary to build a nuke. [14][15] Because the high risk of uncontrollable nuclear action undermines the success of deterrence, nations must look to additional strategies in warfare doctrine.

Nations’ reliance on deterrence alone exacerbates the harms of nuclear war if it were to occur, intensifying the need for a reevaluation of policy. The current primary nuclear strategy is deterrence, which is praised for its defensive nature. Because of limitations on offensive war strategy through such doctrines as the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928, which condemns war as a solution for disputes, society rather encourages defensive war. Such beliefs that deterrence is inversely correlated with the chance of war imply, however, that the case of war would create the most devastating and immoral results possible. The resulting trauma, while intellectually perceivable, evades the understanding of humanity on a psychological level. Beyond the scarce number of survivors from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, there remain no witnesses of a nuclear explosion; not a single national leader has witnessed an atmospheric nuclear test, preventing utter comprehension. The removal of human identification increases chances of war while triggered neglect of other policies decreases precautions in the case of nuclear attack. Furthermore, contrary to doctrine, deterrence does not necessarily rely on the existence of nuclear weapons. Even in the case of complete nuclear elimination, “existential deterrence” would exist from fearful knowledge of nuclear weapons and the possibility of proliferation. Thus, as sole reliance on deterrence prevents supplementary action, nations must look to measures diluting the damage of a nuclear attack, currently hindered by extreme goals, to prevent the worst-case scenario in the case of nuclear war.

            The push of world powers, especially the United States, for the extreme goal of nuclear abolition precludes feasible intermediate steps from being taken, necessary to reducing the harms of nuclear power. Throughout the past decade, the United States has prioritized immediate nonproliferation. In the 1990s, expert commissions deemed the absolute removal of nuclear arms to be possible, if fashioned after the Chemical Weapons Convention, which restricts aspects of chemical weapons. [16]Since then, the motion towards “zero” has only grown, catalyzed by peace-not-war campaigns. Ted Turner, co-chairman of the Nuclear Threat Initiative and advocate of immediate disarmament, stated:

[. . .]We launch this effort, [. . .] the complete elimination of all weapons of mass destruction, including nuclear weapons, as quickly as possible. If fewer is better, then [. . .], zero is best. Every U.S. president since President Johnson has pledged to work towards the elimination of nuclear weapons as dictated by the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And as recently as last May, all of the declared nuclear weapons states reaffirmed their, quote, "unequivocal undertaking," unquote, towards that end. [17]

Turner emphasized the necessity to look foremost to total elimination. However, nations are looking to primarily aim all policy to reach nonproliferation “as quickly as possible.” While speed and efficacy are encouraged to preclude safety and security, the latter remain a more important goal to the public and a more realistic approach to nonproliferation.

Emphasis on nonproliferation, while an appropriate goal, obstructs the success of other international nuclear policies. Such radical movement has negatively affected the success of the treaties such as the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT); the United States, along with eight other Annex 2 nations, has not yet ratified the treaty. [18][19] The CTBT’s fatal debate was over the highly contested date projected for the goal of nonproliferation, preventing its enforcement. [20]In addition, NATO’s dislike for No First Use policy stems from its support of nuclear weapons launching as a tool of retaliation against extreme conventional warfare. [21] Such treaties are fundamental to global safety, yet controversies over nonproliferation doctrine have precluded efforts of cooperation.

Furthermore, policies seeking to improve the quality of nuclear weapons have been foregone in favor of cheaper, more powerful, and a greater number of armaments. For instance, nuclear fallout is a hazardous long-term effect of detonation examined by scientists; one nuclear explosion could cause up to 20,000 deaths by cancer due to plutonium inhalation. [22] In July 1957, scientists from the University of California’s Livermore radiation laboratory created a new H-bomb, stating that it was “96% freer from radioactive fallout than the first models [and that] given more time and testing, […] the U.S. could make a truly nonradioactive weapon, ‘the clean bomb.’” [23] However, the invention was deemed a disappointment and a propagandistic failure, due to a lack of public interest, and was abandoned. [24[Although the 1957 bomb was not successful, governments still could have taken notice and pushed for cleaner weapons. But interest was placed in increasing weapons’ impacts rather than their safety; the next month, the first intercontinental ballistic missile was successfully tested by the Soviet Union.

Beyond hindering nuclear development, nonproliferation prioritization also affects extrinsic foreign objectives. For instance, such efforts raise mistrust among superpowers, hurting efforts at peacekeeping, as can be exemplified by the United States’ efforts in Lebanon under President Reagan. [25] Peacekeeping has long revolved around self-interest; but William O’Brien and John Langan noted the effects of the nuclear age:

The limitation on [peacekeeping] effectiveness [is]: concern for the sensitivities of its nuclear antagonist prevents the sponsoring power from securing the peace by a disarmament of the local contestants […] but domestic opinion will not accept casualties suffered in the course of what appears to be half-hearted and ineffective pacification. Peacekeeping […is] palliative, securing at best a remission, not a cure, of the situation it was intended to settle. [26]

Currently, nuclear powers are in such a state of paranoia, holding thousands of weapons for quick accessibility. Thus, at the point where a leap to nonproliferation is skewing the value structure of war and preventing progress towards a safer nuclear world, nuclear policy must look to the welfare of the people in the chance of nuclear attack.

            Hence, nations’ reliance on deterrence nuclear strategy and determination for nonproliferation policy precludes action towards practical steps regarding nuclear weapons. One of the main issues with developing global nuclear strategy is the concept of a moral incentive. While nonproliferation plans and supporters, such as the Catholic Church, offer the immorality of nuclear weapons as the reason to disarm, such incentivization falsely assumes that all leaders have the same moral code. But beyond clearly irrational leaders, there is no singular just policy due to the morality dilemma surrounding nuclear use. The only justification for nuclear attack is the protection of values; yet such force, if used, would exceedingly violate human rights and morality. Essentially, scholars default to whether a nuclear scenario substantiates an emergency ethic, or “an acknowledgement that a subversion of the ends by its means is a possibility,” a decision that constituted the Catholic Church’s unexpected advocacy of nuclear attack, an action previously renounced as immoral. [27] But nuclear power exists and is not leaving; the only way to overcome the possibility of devastation is for nations to work together with reasonable steps. Thus, in a world where nonproliferation is not close to being a realistic goal, nuclear policy must overlook reliance on deterrence and complete disarmament, and rather seek realistic steps to protect the world’s population.